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Abstract 
 Mental health parity legislation has gone through a series of distinct iterations each 
resulting in more strict regulations being placed on insurance providers in order to ensure 
equality of access to mental health treatment. Parity, by requiring that health insurance plans 
offer the same coverage and benefits for physical and mental ailments, attempts to expand both 
coverage and access. From 2008-2015 two distinct federal mental health parity laws were 
implemented from the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equality Act to the Affordable Care 
Act’s essential health benefits package. Alongside these reforms, states responded in kind 
implementing, expanding, or neglecting the requirements outlined by the federal government. 
This study tested these mental health parity laws against a population of individuals who self-
reported the number of poor mental health days that they had experience in the past 30 days. It 
found moderate effects from the passage of parity requirements on small employer plans and 
some, contrary to expected, worsening outcomes from the expansion of parity laws to the 
individual market in a state.  
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1. Introduction  
 Prior to the passage of mental health parity laws, the history of mental health insurance 
demarcated a clear distinction between the benefits and coverage received by individuals for 
physical health and mental health (Barry et al., 2003). Higher co-pays, less extensive 
pharmaceutical coverage, higher deductibles, non-quantitative limits, and lower yearly treatment 
limits hindered individuals with mental health issues from receiving care for their illnesses. In 
response to the disparity between physical and mental health, state governments and the United 
States federal government have attempted an array of methods to address the prevalence of 
mental illness in the United States. Among these methods have been laws which attempt to close 
the gap between physical and mental health coverage. In large part, this approach has been 
supported by research linking therapy treatment to a betterment in mental health outcomes under 
the economic theory that a reduction in the cost of treatment by incorporating mental health into 
insurance plans would result in a greater number of people receiving benefits (Banerjee, 
Chatterji, and Lahiri 2015).  
The economic effects of mental illness occurs through both direct and indirect means. In 
terms of direct economic cost, mental illness has been linked to an uptick of physical illness, 
reduced effectiveness of physical therapy, E.R. and ambulatory services related to mental 
illnesses, a subsequent decrease in the value of life for untreated populations, and the cost of life 
lost due to suicide (Bartel and Taubman 1986; Lawrence and Kisely 2010; Rice, Kelman, and 
Miller 1992). The exact direct cost of mental health is variable and dependent upon the value 
placed upon life and quality of life. The associated indirect costs are linked to a decrease in 
productivity in the workplace, an increase in absent days due to mental illness, a higher rate of 
unemployment, the costs of incarceration, and decreased wages and wage potential (Banerjee, 
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Chatterji, and Lahiri 2015; Chatterji, Alegria, and Takeuchi 2011; Rice, Kelman, and Miller 
1992). When combined, these two categories of cost have provided an incentive for governments 
in the United States to address the mental health crisis.  
This study focuses upon the effectiveness of legislative responses designed to ensure 
mental health parity from the years 2008 to 2015 by evaluating the difference in self-reported 
mental health outcomes from a broad sample across the United States sourced from The 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System’s dataset from the Center for Disease Control. In 
doing so, this study tracks the intent to treat, the passage of the law and the final mental health 
outcome, but does not evaluate the effectiveness of various therapy treatments nor determines the 
expansion in demand for those services. 
 State and federal laws are accounted for across the time-period and represented as binary 
statistics, variables which reflect a “1” if the law is in effect and a “0” if it is not. This study, 
however, does not track the precise effect that the laws have had on premium rates or out-of-
pocket expenditures for the various laws. Instead, the focus of the paper is to determine whether 
the laws result in the intended reduction in the economic cost of mental illness through an 
improvement in mental health outcomes. While some would advise considering the laws at parity 
only if the coverage is mandated, this paper does not. 
For the purposes of this study, a law is only considered to be a “parity law” if it requires 
consistency across the health insurance plan in terms of both quantitative and non-quantitative 
limits. Quantitative limits are considered equal if the deductible on the health insurance plan 
combines both mental and physical health costs, co-pays are equivalent across the plan for 
analogous treatments, and treatment limits are set to the same amount. Non-quantitative limits 
are considered equal if there are no distinctions in the benefits of the insurance plan between 
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prescription medication formularies, prior authorization, fail-first protocol, utilization 
management, or any other non-quantitative controls on mental health insurance when compared 
to the plan’s coverage for physical health.  
The results from this study indicate small but significant coefficients for small businesses 
with the largest change occurring in the binary statistics created for when “0 days” were 
reported. The large-business and individual market laws were, generally, not significant and may 
reflect a variety of economic effects which limit the ability for these laws to reduce poor mental 
health outcomes. In one model, parity laws in individual market were associated with worsening 
mental health conditions associated with the passage of the law.  
 
2. Background 
2.1 Federal and state regulations 
 Federal mental health parity law has evolved gradually over time from the 1996 Mental 
Health Parity Act (MHPA) to the roll-out of the Affordable Care Act’s essential health benefits 
in 2014. Beginning with the 1996 MHPA, the Department of Health and Human services in 
conjunction with state health authorities regulated large-group plans, health insurance received 
by employees in firms with greater than 50 employees, to require that spending limits by the 
insurance company were consistent across illnesses. MHPA, however, did not require 
compliance across non-quantitative limits nor did it regulate other functions of mental health 
insurance. In essence, it increased the amount individuals could spend if their plan previously 
had a lower limit but did not change any of the barriers which make it difficult for patients to 
receive high quality care. Further, MHPA requirements only went in to effect when the plan 
offered mental health coverage and did not mandate that mental health coverage was offered. 
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 The 2008 Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA) went a step further 
than the MHPA. The Health and Human Services agency released guidelines in 2010 requiring 
large-group plans to ensured non-quantitative limits were in compliance with parity standards. 
Similar to the MHPA, it does not mandate that mental health coverage is given to employees. 
However, the law stipulates that should the business decide to include mental health coverage in 
its benefits package then it must be done at parity. In the essential health benefit rules released in 
2014, the Affordable Care Act extended the requirements of the MHPAEA to small-group plans 
and plans on the individual market. The ACA, thus, expanded federal regulations to cover at 
mental health at parity under all plans excluding Medicaid and Medicare. Unlike the previous 
laws, the ACA mandates that health insurance plans provide mental health coverage as part of 
the essential health benefits package with the parity regulations created by the MHPAEA.  
 Throughout and prior to the range of this study, state governments passed mental health 
parity laws which often expanded on existing federal laws. When there is an overlapping of 
federal and state parity laws, the law functions as follows: the federal law, if providing more 
strict standards than the state law, supersedes state authority, but if a state law is broader in its 
parity requirements or requires a certain minimum threshold of benefits, then the state law’s 
requirements are implemented by the state’s health authority and are not overridden by federal 
parity laws. Amongst the fifty states, Alabama, Oklahoma, Texas, Wyoming, and Missouri have 
concluded that their state health agencies do not have the authority to enforce the ACA’s 
extension of the MHPAEA to individual and small-group plans without new state legislation, 
which as of the writing of this paper has not occurred. In these instances, the HHS alone 
regulates the mental health insurance markets in the state. Of the states, seven prior to the study 
had comprehensive parity laws.   
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 Up until the implementation of the MHPAEA, The Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) provided a large obstacle to the regulation of health insurance by the 
states.  ERISA exempts large-group plans which are self-insured, insurance set up by the 
company and company unions for its employees as opposed to utilizing an outside insurance 
provider, from state laws regulating health insurance. Because of this, the effect of ERISA 
tended to bias studies which evaluate state laws towards a null effect if individuals from self-
insured large group were including in the sample and, thus, undervalues the effects of parity. In 
sum, state mental health insurance regulations do not affect the entire population of the state 
(Andersen 2015). Along with the federal ERISA law, state and federal laws have included 
multiple exemptions such as grandfather clauses or premium thresholds designed to protect 
businesses from unexpected price increases (Buchmueller et al. 2007). The effect and rate at 
which these exemptions have reduced the impact of mental health parity laws is unclear. 
 
2.2. Previous Literature 
 Many studies have attempted to determine the extent to which mental health parity has 
effected various dependent variables for tracking mental health outcomes. Amongst them, there 
have been distinct variable approaches to determining the effectiveness of the law. In relation to 
state laws, two studies have tracked the effect of mental health parity on suicide rates and found 
null effects (Klick and Markowitz 2006; Lang 2013). Suicide as a measure certainly gains some 
insight into one of the large costs of mental illness, the loss of life and the potential of those lives 
in terms of possible future labor and production. However, it does not reflect the entire scope and 
effect of the laws. For instance, the failure to reduce the number of suicides does not necessarily 
indicate that other economic costs, productivity for instance, are not improving. Instead, it 
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measures a single outcome at the most extreme end of mental health crises. Further, these papers 
took, essentially, a binary approach to mental health issues as opposed to a spectrum which the 
literature indicates has been a more productive approach to evaluating mental health benefits 
(Harris, Carpenter, and Bao 2006).   
Other papers have utilized different spectrum as opposed to a binary approach. One such 
approach has been the utilization of the K6 scale which asks individuals a series of weighted 
questions designed to create a number reflecting the quality of a person’s mental health (Harris, 
Carpenter, and Bao 2006). The paper utilizing the K6 scale found that the imposition of mental 
health parity requirements resulted in a betterment for those with relatively mild mental health 
issues. One paper tracked an uptick in the utilization of autism services (Bilaver and Jordan 
2013). Another found an increase in the delivery of substance abuse aid (Wen et al. 2013). 
Indication of an increase in the utilization of services, while possibly correlated with an 
improvement in mental health, does not necessary reflect a betterment in the individual’s mental 
health status. When taking into account diminishing returns to mental health treatment, as 
discussed below, there is a point at which utilization does not equate to any betterment. 
Studies have also focused on specific mental health issues including specialty care, 
bipolar disorder, and major depression (A. B. Busch et al. 2013; Ettner et al. 2016). While 
singling out these specific diseases would be beneficial for advocacy centered upon those 
illnesses, it does not reflect the sum benefits of the program across a general population and is an 
incomplete analysis of the entire policy’s effect on mental health.    
Others studies have tracked the effects of parity laws on out-of-pocket expenditures by 
the individuals effected by mental illness including increased premiums and decreased out-of-
pocket spending (Barry and Busch 2007; Cseh 2008a; Grazier et al. 2015; Harwood et al. 2016; 
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Meyerhoefer and Zuvekas 2010). Another study tracked the different benefits of health insurance 
plans and found that the law did result in the implementation of its financial requirements 
(Horgan et al. 2015). Although, several other studies have found a null effect on mental health 
outcomes due to state laws (Bao and Sturm 2004; A. B. Busch et al. 2013).  
 Amongst the various studies there have been attempts to single-out specific populations 
to determine precise effects of parity on those groups. Federal employees, while outside of the 
scope of this paper, have experience an improvement of their mental health due to the imposition 
of mental health parity on their health insurance and may indicate the benefits of parity more 
broadly (Goldman et al. 2006). Studies, also, have singled out specific firms and found overall 
cost reductions in managed care frameworks due to the decrease in physical ailments related to 
mental health coverage (Zuvekas et al. 2002). Amongst small employers, one study found a 
reduction in out-of-pocket expenditures for families whose children utilized mental health 
insurance (S. H. Busch and Barry 2008).  
 While research thus far has given broad overviews of the intentions and goals of the 
ACA’s broadening of the pool of insurance plans under the purview of the MHPAEA, few have 
analyzed the data coming out over the past few years (Beronio, Glied, and Frank 2014). Given 
that the final rules for the ACA were only implemented on January 1st of 2014, this is not 
surprising. Contrary to previous studies which primarily focused upon a limited sample from a 
single employer or a list of employers, this paper gets to the core of the Affordable Care Act’s 
goals, to provide mental health coverage across plans. Instead of using a binary variable for 
tracking mental health, for example suicide rates, this paper utilizes a self-reported mental health 
statistic with a range of possible responses. This paper has a distinct approach in that it evaluates 
the effect of all parity laws on the sample population. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 BRFSS Participants and Data Collection 
 This paper utilizes The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System’s (BRFSS) from the 
CDC’s yearly dataset of interviews. The BRFSS survey is a nationally conducted cross-section 
of health and risky behaviors. It utilizes phone calls to interview respondents and asks a series of 
questions of use to researchers. In 2007, the BRFSS added cellphones calls into their data 
gathering methodology where previously it had solely employed landline calls. While the effects 
of this change may be captured by the design of the survey, the precise effect of this shift is 
unclear. The individuals who respond are anonymous, but the individual’s state of residence, 
employment, race, gender, education, and income are self-reported and reflected in the dataset. 
For the purposes of this study, the territories and Washington D.C. were excluded from the 
sample to focus upon the effects solely in states.  
 Two tests were conducted against the total population, one which singled out only those 
who claimed to have insurance and another against the entire population of the survey.  This was 
done to determine the potential effect, for example, of possible premium increases on the rate of 
insurance for those with mental health issues. A second sample was utilized which included 
solely those who claimed to have health insurance which was represented by a smaller group of 
individuals. These tests were used to determine whether the insured population was experiencing 
an improvement in their mental health outcomes.  
The large sample size of the BRFSS gives a more robust understanding to the effects of 
mental health parity. While the survey indicates whether an individual has insurance, it does not 
indicate the source from which they receive their coverage. The effect of this limitation on the 
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dataset would tend to cause mental health parity to gravitate towards a null effect because each 
law, with regards to large-group, small-group, and non-group, effects a different section of the 
population rather than the entire set. However, phenomenon such as suicide clusters, an event 
where one individual committing suicide causes a series of others to commit suicide as well, may 
point towards spill-over effects of treatments on one section of the population (Haw et al. 2013). 
Further, because spouses may be beneficiaries of the insurance policies of an employee at a firm, 
there is a broader effect to these laws than solely the employee. The approach taken by this paper 
would be able to pick-up some of these spill-over effects.  
 The passage of the Affordable Care Act changed many of the characteristics of the 
insurance market. To ensure that there was little interference with the regressions, individuals 
below the age of 26 were dropped from the sample. In addition, to rule out those who could be 
receiving Medicare, an insurance program whose final-rules were published later than 
commercial plans, respondents over the age of 64 were likewise dropped from the sample. 
Respondents who either refused to answer the question about mental health or did not know their 
response were excluded from the sample as well.  
3.2. Mental Health Parity Variable  
Table 1 lists the various state laws prior to and during the timeframe of this study. The 
information was converted into three binary statistics to indicate that a state had adopted a 
mental health parity law; these were large-group parity, small-group parity, and individual 
market parity. While the state laws do not affect those businesses regulated by ERISA, the 
timeframe of the study dampens the effect of the exemption because the federal parity law, 
MHPAEA which altered ERISA guidelines to require parity, issued its final rulings in 2010.  
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A law was considered to be a “parity law” if it required both non-quantitative and 
quantitative equivalence in coverage and benefits. The most distinct example of a state which 
could push parity requirements towards a insignificant effect due to this definition would be 
Delaware which had a law which explicitly allowed non-quantitative treatment limitations if 
there was no greater financial burden associated with the limit. Under the framework of this 
paper, this law was not considered parity for the purposes of this parity binary variable.  
Because there has been some question as to which sections of the mentally ill population 
have benefited from additional coverage from parity laws, three additional binary variables were 
used to test different mental health outcomes (Grazier et al. 2015; Harris, Carpenter, and Bao 
2006). These three variables were coded as a “1”, respectively, if the mental health report of the 
individual was greater than 0 days, greater than 10 days, or reported exactly 30 poor days. A 
negative coefficient on the 0 day dummy variable would effectively indicate that people were 
gravitating towards completely solving their mental health issues. The 10 day variable tests 
whether the middle section of mental health outcomes is being treated. 30 days, while not a 
perfect measure, would test those who would be high utilizers of psychiatric and psychological 
services to determine if they are receiving care and if the regulations are helping those who are 
the worst off.  
3.3 Mental Health Outcomes Variable  
Within the BRFSS, there are multiple potential variables which can be used to track the 
effects of parity on mental health outcomes. While there are several binary statistics, this study 
utilizes a non-binary statistic which asked the individuals interviewed the number of poor mental 
health days that they had experienced in the past 30 days. While not the same as the K6 scale, it 
captures some of the benefits of self-reporting on a scale of days as opposed to diagnosis or 
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suicides. Figure 1 shows a histogram of the results of these interviews. Notably, the numbers 
aggregate around 0, 5, 10,15, 20, and 30. This could pose a potential issue in the data because the 
effect of mental health parity may have to be quite large in order to cause an individual to report 
a lower number of days.  
 The use of a non-binary variable is ideal for mental health parity because of the nature of 
these illnesses. Because it is unlikely that an individual will be entirely cured of their illness, 
diagnoses do not always occur for the illnesses nor are reported with a high level of frequency, 
mental illness is contextualized to the individual, suicides do not reflect the entire scope of 
mental health outcomes, and marginal improvement can be tracked better by self-reporting, the 
number of days’ statistic provides a better model than one which tracks individual diseases. A 
negative coefficient on this statistic would indicate that individuals interviewed are reporting 
lower numbers of days following the implementation of mental health parity laws.  
3.4 Control Variables 
 Gender, education, and race were used to determine the effects of these demographics on 
mental health. Educational responses were recoded into a binary variable to reflect whether the 
respondent had attained a high school education or greater. Race was broken down into dummy 
variables: self-identified Black, Latino, and a variable which reflected any other non-white 
response.  
Alongside these variables, this study employed several other statistics. The number of 
psychiatrists per 1000 jobs, collected through the Bureau of Labor Statistics, was meant to 
determine the effect of access and mental health economics on mental health outcomes. Binary 
variables for mandated offering laws and mandated minimum benefits were used to determine 
the effect of these other laws on mental health outcomes. In addition, a binary variable was 
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coded to indicate that a state was one of the five which had determined that it could not enforce 
federal mental health laws.  
3.5 Empirical Model 
 State fixed and year effects were used for the ordinary least-squared (OLS) regressions in 
this paper. State fixed effects were used for the purposes of this paper for two distinct reasons. 
First, it gives each state its own baseline contextualized to its qualitative differences when 
compared to other states. Second, it can correct for the omission of time-invariant characteristics 
in random effects models. Within the literature, there is a debate over whether fixed effects 
should be used. For instance, when mental health effects on labor outcomes have been switched 
to a state fixed effects model from a random effects model, the regression were not robust 
indicating a possible difference in personality, state dynamics, or other non-measured 
characteristics rather than mental health (Andersen 2015; Cseh 2008b). In fixed effect models, 
there is the risk of policy endogeneity which occurs due to the difficulty of comparing states to 
one another. For instance, states without parity laws are used to determine the potential mental 
health outcomes in a state with parity if it had not passed the law. Due to the differences in 
states, there could be a problem in exporting one state’s results to another. In the context of the 
BRFSS survey, this study does not make the assumption that there are individuals in the sample 
who are unaffected by the implementation of a parity law. For the mental health outcome Yist, 
the specification would be: 
 Yist= α + β1Parityst + β2Xit + β3Zst + β4γt + β5Ss + µ 
 Here, Yist is the expected mental health response by an individual in each state and time. 
Here the Parity variable is a stand in for the three-tiered approach of this paper. Large-business 
parity is coded as a “1” if the state has a law which requires large-group plans to cover mental 
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health at parity. Small-business parity is coded as a “1” if small-group plans are required to cover 
at parity. Individual parity is coded as a “1” if the individual market in the state or its equivalent 
requires plans to cover mental health at parity. Xit represents a series of covariates related to the 
individual in a given time: sex, race, and high school education. Zst would be time-variant 
characteristics within the state such as other mental health regulations or psychiatric jobs per 
1000 jobs. Ss and γt are the fixed effects for the state and year respectively and are represented in 
the dataset by dummy variables.  
 
4. Results  
4.1 Large Business Parity 
 Table 2 and 3 give the results of various effects of mental health parity requirements on 
mental health outcomes. In all instances, the addition of a law requiring large businesses to 
provide insurance at parity did not have a robust effect and, frequently, a small positive 
coefficient which is not inconsistent with the existing literature (Grazier et al. 2015). There are 
several different effects occurring within large-businesses and prior to the time period of this 
papers’ test that tend to push the regression of large-business parity towards insignificant.  
 First, important to note is that a “0” for the binary statistic representing parity does not 
indicate that an individual in a large firm is going from no coverage to coverage at parity. 
Instead, it simply indicates that the law has been put in to effect by the state or federal 
government. It does not guarantee that someone seeks treatment, and it is within the realm of 
possibilities that someone within a large business would already be receiving insurance benefits 
at parity before and after the passage of the MHPAEA if their employer was already offering 
mental health services at parity. The MHPA ensured that annual limits were the same across 
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mental health and physical health and occurred prior to the dates of this paper. Several sources 
indicate that there are diminishing returns to mental health treatments (Falkenström et al. 2016; 
Howard et al. 1986). Others also indicate that there is a point at which improved mental health 
outcomes are unlikely to occur at all (Barkham et al., 2006). 
 Second, outside of the existing laws, large businesses may have been incentivized to 
provide mental health coverage for their workers at the equilibrium point between spending 
company funds and the returns in terms of benefits to increased productivity of their workers. 
However, a market failure with regards to the mental health of workers could be possible if a 
company has determined that the supply of workers is sufficiently high that it would be cheaper 
to hire someone new instead of treating their workers. Additionally, companies may be unware 
of symptoms of poor mental health which occur infrequently or are not readily apparent. 
 Finally and applying to all the forms of parity below, some literature indicates that there 
is a moral hazard attached to expanding mental health insurance coverage and benefits.There has 
been a strong connection in the literature linking addiction services, one of the areas covered by 
the MHPAEA, to an uptick in the consumption of alcohol (Klick and Markowitz 2006). Alcohol, 
being a depressant, could have had a downward effect on the regression. In addition, other 
variables associated with risky mental health behavior could be increasing along with alcohol 
consumption.  
 4.2 Small-Business Parity   
 Parity requirements placed upon small businesses have had the largest and most 
frequently significant output of all the parity requirements. Within the regressions done across 
the entire population of the survey, the first model including only race, sex, and education, had a 
negative coefficient of -0.110 which indicates a decrease in the mean number of poor mental 
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health days due to the imposition of a requirement on small businesses. This should be read as a 
large effect because it is regressed against the entire pool of respondents and not simply those 
who work for a small business. While the binary tests of those with greater than 10 days of poor 
mental health and those who reported 30 poor mental health days were insignificant, the test of 
whether parity resulted in an increased chance of reporting 0 poor mental health days did result 
in a significant negative coefficient of -0.0114 or a 1.14 percentage point improvement. This 
finding is consistent with previous research on the improvement of mild mental health issues 
(Harris, Carpenter, and Bao 2006).  
 When tested against the sample of individuals who indicated on their interviews that they 
had some form of health insurance coverage, small-business parity requirements were 
consistently negative and significant across all of models except for the model utilizing a greater 
than 10 days binary variable. The coefficient for the most simple test which included solely the 
characteristics of the individuals being interviewed resulted in a -0.134 coefficient. The largest 
coefficient again for the binary tests was the variable for an increase in the probability of 
individuals reporting that they had “0” poor days.  
 The discrepancy between the two different populations (insured and general) may 
indicate the occurrence of some economic and individual effects. Small-businesses due to 
increasing cost associated with the imposition of parity laws may be dropping their coverage of 
employees resulting in a smaller population being covered out of the entire sample, an effect 
which would have a less pronounced influence on the second test only against those who have 
insurance. This could be reflected as an improvement if the the people staying with insurance 
were generally better off than the prior population of insured individuals  
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 The concurrence between the two populations that individuals were approaching a report 
of “0” may indicate that relatively minor mental health issues were being resolved quickly by 
parity laws. Because this survey only has one full year of data after the imposition of the 
Affordable Care Act’s essential health benefits, it is likely that those who are reporting 30 or 
greater than 10 days have more severe mental health issues requiring a greater amount of therapy 
in order to reduce the number of poor days.  
4.3 Individual Parity 
 Individual parity requirements are unique when compared to the other parity 
requirements because in some of the models it resulted in a positive significant coefficient 
reflecting worsening mental health outcomes in model 5 of the general population. However, 
when controlled for those who have insurance, the coefficients becomes insignificant in all but 
the mental health binary tests. This could be occurring for many of the same reasons as explained 
above. Parity requirements could be linked to a moral hazard which causes individuals to 
experience worse mental health outcomes in the short term before addiction treatments can 
resolve the issue. Premium increases in conjunction with the higher probability of a lower 
income for those with mental illnesses may be causing those with the worst mental health to lose 
what coverage that they had as they decide to not purchase insurance. This would be reflected in 
the general population but not in the insured sample. 
 On the other hand, some research has indicated that there has been a reduction in health 
care costs due to the imposition of mental health care regulations (Zuvekas et al. 2002). If mental 
health services have the co-benefit of reducing physical health ailments, then the result would be 
a subsequent decrease in the utilization of physical health services and emergency room visits.  
19 
 
Finally, the increase may be reflective of other issues associated with enforcement which 
may affect the individual market more than businesses. A study found that across states there is 
general ambiguity about what type of coverage individuals are receiving and that it is not 
infrequent for compliance with the laws to be low (Berry et al. 2015). Because the mental health 
expansion went in to effect with a list of other essential benefits, enforcement and oversight 
could be less than it would have been otherwise as resources were spread more thin over 
regulating a broad pool of insurance plans. If the individuals were certain of their mental health 
coverage prior to the introduction of the individual markets in their state under the affordable 
care act but no longer are, there could be a decrease in the use of the services. In general, the 
policies attached to large and small employers could be more clear and consistent with Federal 
law resulting in the disproportional impact on those receiving their health insurance on 
individual marketplaces. 
4.4 Covariates and Control Variables  
 Consistent with prior research, sex indicating that a respondent was female had a high 
coefficient and was significant (Dagher, Chen, and Thomas 2015).  This statistic indicates that 
woman is on average likely to have approximately 1.3 more worse days in a 30 day period. 
Likewise, identifying as Latino (3), or other non-white (4) had significant coefficients reflecting 
more poor mental health days across the entire population.  
 However, identifying as Black (2) was associated with a better mental health outcome. 
Rather than reflecting a generally better mental health in black communities, the survey may be 
picked up on a more intense stigma attached to mental health issues in these communities. In 
general, black individuals are less likely to seek treatment and more likely to deny having mental 
health issues deserving of treatment (Alvidrez, Snowden, and Kaiser 2008). While every 
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population is effected by mental health stigma, this study indicates that it is more pronounced for 
black individuals. 
Mandated offering schemes, similar to the parity statistics, reveal a mixed picture. 
Mandated individual offering was significant with a coefficient of 0.136 and 0.108 in the general 
population and insured population respectively. Large-group mandated offering resulted in a 
significant -0.117 and -0.105 a for the two populations respectively. Individual mandated 
offering, because it was largely a function of the Affordable Care Act and was infrequently 
required by state policy, may be picking up issues associated with the ACA outlined above. 
Mandated offering for large businesses is, most likely, negative due to requiring that businesses 
provide coverage with MHPAEA requirements with the issue of the final rules of the ACA’s 
essential health benefits. Small-group mandated offering could be insignificant if companies 
were already offering some form of mental health coverage and simply expanded to parity 
standards. 
 The psychiatrist jobs per 1,000 jobs was never significant. This possibly indicates that 
variations in the statistic for psychiatrist jobs per 1,000 may be more reflective of economic 
trends than mental health utilization or state policies. Having a high school education results in 
approximately 3.2 to 3.9 better days depending on the sample and a large percentage point shift 
in all of the binary statistics. 
Interestingly, a state which concluded that they did not have the authority to enforce the 
Affordable Care Act’s essential health benefits received a negative and significant co-efficient in 
the general sample but not in the insured population sample. In the instance of a state refusing to 
enforce the Federal Parity Law, the department of health and human services would regulate the 
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individual marketplace. The greater presence of the federal authority may resolve the issue of 
transparency of benefits which may increase usage in the state.  
 
5. Discussion and Limitations 
   Findings of significant improvements due to parity regulations is important for several 
reasons the first of which is it indicates that there is at least some elasticity of demand. If demand 
for mental health services was inelastic, indicating that individuals were willing to pay regardless 
of the cost, the regressions would be insignificant reflecting a possible decrease in out-of-pocket 
expenditures but not a real change in mental health outcomes. Instead, this paper’s significant 
coefficients for small-group plans indicates some elasticity of demand which is consistent with 
research indicating that there is a greater elasticity of demand for mental health services than 
physical health services (Keeler, Manning, and Wells 1988). The insignificance of the large-
group and small-group mandated offering statistics is important because it may indicate that 
businesses are offering mental health benefits regardless of the loop-hole in the law which would 
allow them to not offer any at all. 
 The regressions indicate small improvement to mental health outcomes when small 
businesses were required and non-robust coefficients for large businesses across the general 
population of the same. The finding is important because it indicates that the effect of simply 
mandating increased coverage may be insufficient to result in the broad economic benefits 
promised by these policies when each of the different parity laws is weighed. Important to note 
from the histogram, however, is that the mean number of days reported was already on the low 
end do to the large number of “0 days” responses. A small shift in the mean downward may 
represent a large change in the mentally ill population.  
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 Unlike large businesses with far greater numbers of employees, the incentives to hire new 
individuals in small businesses may have been more prevalent than in large businesses which 
would see greater returns across productivity of their entire workforce should they expand 
mental health access. Small businesses, likewise, may have less capital to utilize in terms of 
insurance coverage, and the benefits could have been perceived as insignificant. These two 
possible explanatory variables may indicate that there is a larger market failure in relation to 
small businesses than in their large business counterparts.  
In part, limited effects of these laws may be due to a perception of stigma. Perception of 
stigma, the idea that mental illness is not a real issue deserving of treatment, has been an 
effective predictor of whether or not individual will drop-out of treatment (Sirey et al. 2001). 
One study found that out of those with mental illnesses only one third consulted a therapist 
which may confirm a large barrier to treatment (Andrews, Issakidis, and Carter 2001). While 
measuring stigma’s effect on the large population of individuals interviewed by the BRFSS 
would be difficult to ascertain, it certainly could be suppressing some of the benefits of mental 
health parity laws.  
 Another possible issue when approaching this study is the effects of intra-state disparities 
in access. For example, individuals in rural areas of a state, while receiving coverage for 
behavioral health services, are less likely to be able to utilize those services due to concerns over 
access, transportation time, and knowledge of available options (DeLeon, Wakefield, and 
Hagglund 2003). Rural individuals then would be more likely to continue to report the same 
mental health outcomes regardless of their insurance status  
 Given the results of the individual parity statistic, further research may be needed to be 
done to pin-point the precise reason for the finding. Those results could reflect any number of 
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variables from moral hazard to premium burdens. Each of which would add to the literature base 
of the ACA’s mental health benefit stipulations. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 This study, consistent with many of previous studies, found a moderate significant effect 
for small-group firms and an interesting increasing coefficient for individual plans when 
regressed against the entire population of the survey and in the binary tests. It found shifting 
from the laws which required equality of treatment caps (MHPA) to a broader regulation 
consistent with parity standards was insignificant. These results indicate that, in general, parity 
laws have some benefit for those with poor mental health outcomes. These results indicate that 
each of these different sections of the field for insurance may be experiencing varying levels of 
market failures. In some instances, such as individual parity, it may be inadvisable to require 
health insurance on the individual market to cover mental health at parity. Other policies, such as 
minimum benefits in the individual market, should be evaluated to determine whether they 
provide a better balance of cost and benefit given diminishing marginal returns to treatments. In 
addition, this study does suggest that if mental health is to be treated seriously additional policies 
designed to increase access, reduce stigma, and increase the effectiveness of therapy treatments 
will need to be evaluated.  
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Table 1  
 Most Recent Pre-
2008 
Pre-ACA (2008-
2013) 
Post-ACA (2014-2016) 
Alabama 2001- Large 
employers must 
cover mental health 
at parity 
N/A N/A 
Alaska 2004- Required 
coverage of drug 
abuse or alcoholism 
by small and large 
businesses 
2009- Minimum 
mandated benefits 
setting floors for 
mental health 
annual limits 
2014 – Passed a law 
indicating that the state 
will enforce the federal 
parity law.  
Arizona 1998- Mandated 
offering of mental 
health insurance 
N/A N/A 
 
Arkansas 1983- Minimum 
benefits in group 
accident policies  
 
1987- Required 
treatment of alcohol 
and drug 
dependency 
 
 
2009- 
Large Employers 
are no longer 
mandated to offer 
mental health 
insurance  
 
Individual and small 
businesses must 
offer optional 
mental health 
coverage 
N/A 
California 1974- Mandated 
coverage for mental 
and nervous 
disorders  
 
2000- Basic Parity 
Amendment for all 
types of commercial 
plans 
N/A 2012- Individual and 
small business plans must 
abide by and follow 
Federal Parity standards 
Colorado 2003- Court-ordered 
substance abuse 
treatment must be 
covered  
 
2006- Mandated 
Offering of optional 
mental health 
coverage 
2013- Small 
Employer fully-
insured plans must 
cover mental health 
(but not necessarily 
at parity) 
2016- Parity standards are 
extended across all plans 
in the state 
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Connecticut 2000- Mental 
Health Parity across 
plans with a 
mandated coverage 
provision 
N/A 2016- Additional 
regulations on NQTLs 
and State regulations on 
mental health parity 
Delaware 1999- Individual, 
Small, Large, must 
cover severe mental 
illnesses but may 
place NQTLs on 
coverage as long as 
it does not place a 
‘greater financial 
burden’ 
N/A N/A 
 
Florida 2000- Small and 
Large fully-insured 
plans must offer and 
cover with a 
minimum benefit 
N/A N/A 
Georgia 1998-  
Individual pseudo-
parity- allows 
annual limits 
 
Small Employers- 
Mandated offer with 
minimum benefit 
 
Large Employer- 
mandated offer with 
some exemptions  
N/A N/A 
Hawaii 1988- Mental 
Health and Alcohol 
and Drug Abuse 
Treatment Insurance 
benefits must be 
given at parity  
 
2005- 
Comprehensive 
Parity for serious 
mental illnesses – 
amended the 
definition to be 
more expansive 
N/A 2014- Updated language 
of their parity law to 
comply with federal 
parity regulations. 
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Idaho 2006- Mental 
Health Parity 
exclusively for state 
employees with 
severe mental 
illness 
N/A N/A 
Illinois N/A 2011- Parity 
requirements for all 
health insurance 
plans regulated by 
state agencies 
N/A 
Indiana 1997- Parity for 
Public Employees  
 
1999- Minimum 
Mandated Benefits 
with a small 
employer exemption 
 
N/A 2014- Large, Individual, 
and state plans cannot 
restrict access unless 
similar restrictions are on 
physical health and 
insurance 
Iowa 2005- Large 
Employers must 
cover severe mental 
illness 
2011- Group 
policies must 
provide mental 
illness benefits to 
veterans  
 
N/A 
Kansas N/A 2009- Minimum 
mandated benefits 
 
Small and 
individual plans can 
still place treatment 
limits  
 
Prescription 
medications must be 
covered equally 
N/A 
Kentucky 1986- Individual 
and small 
employers must 
offer 
 
2000- Large 
employer fully-
insured- mandated 
offering at parity  
N/A N/A 
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Louisiana N/A 2009- All excluding 
individual plans 
must cover a 
clinical 
psychologist. A 
minimum benefit of 
coverage (still 
excludes 
individual/non-
group plans) 
 
2011- Mandated 
offering for 
businesses and state 
benefit plans  
N/A 
Maine 1983- Minimum 
mandated benefit 
required for certain 
small businesses  
 
2003- small 
businesses not 
covered by the 1983 
law and individual 
plans must offer 
mental health 
coverage 
N/A N/A 
Maryland 1997- Minimum 
mandated benefits 
for all plans 
2010- Fully 
comprehensive 
parity law for large 
businesses, small 
businesses, and 
individual plans  
2016- minimum mandated 
benefit and 
expansion/implementation 
of Federal Parity rules  
Massachusetts 1982- Minimum 
mandated benefits 
for all plans 
2009- Large 
employer fully-
insured, small 
employer fully-
insured, individual 
and state all at 
parity for severe 
illnesses and 
mandated minimum 
for other illnesses 
N/A 
Michigan 1982- Treatment for 
substance abuse 
N/A N/A 
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must be covered by 
all plans  
Minnesota 1999- Mental 
Health Parity, 
limited to “services” 
for all plans that 
offer  
2008- Mental 
Health Parity – all 
plans may not be 
more restrictive on 
mental health than 
on physical health. 
It does not 
mandated coverage. 
2013- insurance plans 
must meet the federal 
parity law  
 
Mississippi 2001- Minimum 
Mandated Benefit 
provisions 
N/A N/A 
Missouri 1999- Mandated 
offering for 
individual plans 
 
2005- coverage and 
parity for large and 
small employers 
plans  
N/A 2015- took effect at the 
beginning of 2017, 
requires insurance to 
cover eating disorders w/ 
a waiver if they an prove 
that coverage increased 
premiums by 2% 
Montana 1999- all insurance 
must cover severe 
mental illnesses  
N/A N/A 
 
Nebraska 1999- Large and 
small employers 
must abide by 
minimum mandated 
benefits  
N/A N/A 
Nevada 1999- Mandated 
minimum benefits  
2008- Mandatory 
minimum benefits 
for small businesses  
 
2009- Mandated 
compliance with 
federal parity law 
N/A 
New Hampshire 1975- Minimum 
Mandated Benefits- 
large and small 
businesses must 
have same ration of 
treatment as 
physical ailments 
(the law is unclear 
as to what effect his 
has on coverage) 
2009- Requires 
compliance with the 
Federal Parity Law  
N/A 
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New Jersey 1999- Mental 
Health Parity for 
DSM severe mental 
disorders 
N/A N/A 
New Mexico 1999- Large and 
small must cover 
mental health with 
allowed exemptions  
N/A N/A 
New York 2006- Large and 
small businesses 
must cover mental 
health and financial 
burden must be 
consistent  
N/A N/A 
North Carolina 1997- Bans 
discrimination 
against the mentally 
ill in receiving care  
 
 
2008- Mandated 
Minimum Benefits 
2015- Requires plans to 
abide by the Federal 
Parity Law 
North Dakota 1985- Mandated 
minimum benefits  
N/A N/A 
Ohio 1979- Self-insured 
health care plans are 
required to meet 
minimum mandated 
benefits 
 
2007- Mental 
Health parity for all 
plans for 
biologically based 
mental illnesses. 
Exemption if 
premiums rise by 
1% 
N/A N/A 
Oklahoma 2000- Group 
coverage for severe 
mental illness 
2010- Large 
employers are 
required to cover 
services for sever 
mental illnesses  
N/A 
Oregon 2007- Mental 
Health Parity for 
small and large 
business plans 
N/A N/A 
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Pennsylvania 1990- Must provide 
benefits for alcohol 
addiction 
2010- Requires 
compliance with the 
Federal Party Law  
N/A 
Rhode Island 1994- all plans must 
cover mental health 
services at parity 
N/A N/A 
South Carolina 1976- large and 
small must offer 
 
2006- State 
Employee Insurance 
must cover mental 
health at parity 
2009- large 
employers must 
cover mental health 
at parity  
N/A 
South Dakota 1998- Biologically 
based mental 
illnesses must be 
covered at parity 
N/A N/A 
Tennessee 2000- Minimum 
Mandated Benefits 
for Large employers 
N/A N/A 
Texas 2007- Minimum 
mandated benefits 
for large employer 
plans  
N/A N/A 
Utah 2010 – Must cover 
catastrophic mental 
health conditions 
2010- Mandated 
offering for large 
and small 
businesses  
 
2010- large 
employers must 
comply with 
Federal Parity Law  
2014- Small and 
Individual plans must 
comply with the federal 
parity law  
Vermont 2007- All insurance 
plans must cover 
mental health at 
parity with physical 
health 
2012- Created new 
enforcement 
mechanisms for 
ensuring 
compliance with 
state law  
2013- The Federal Parity 
Law applies to all 
commercial plans in the 
state  
 
Virginia 2000- Coverage for 
biologically based 
mental illnesses  
 
2006- Minimum 
mandated benefits  
2010- Large 
employers must 
comply with the 
federal Parity Law 
2013- Insurance plans 
must comply with the 
mental health 
requirements of the 
Affordable Care Act 
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Washington 2007- all plans must 
cover mental health 
at parity  
N/A 2015- Mandated Offering 
for all plans  
West Virginia 2002- required 
insurance plans to 
cover severe mental 
health  
2009- Large and 
small businesses 
must cover at parity 
unless the coverage 
causes premiums to 
rise by a set 
percentage 
 
2010- Authorized 
the insurance 
commissioner to 
make and enforce 
parity requirements  
N/A 
Wisconsin N/A 2010- Small with 
more than 10 
employees, large, 
and public employer 
plans must cover at 
parity. If premiums 
rise by more than 
2%, there is an 
exemption 
N/A 
Wyoming N/A 2008 – Accident 
and Sickness 
insurance to tax 
supported 
institutions must 
cover mental health 
at parity  
 
2010- Public 
employer plans 
must cover mental 
health at parity 
N/A 
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Table 2 – 1 
                                                          
1 Race (2) = Black, Race (3) = Latino/a, Race (4) = Non-white Other  
Model 2 – Regressed against a binary mental health statistic - 0 if “0 days” were reported, 1 otherwise. 
Model 3 – Regressed against a binary mental health statistic – 0 if less than 10 days reported, 1 if greater or equal 
Model 4 – Regressed against a binary mental health statistic – 0 if less than 30 days reported, 1 if 30 days.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Standard errors in parentheses
                                                                                                                                    
Observations              2130951         2130951         2130951         2130951         2047334         2047334         2047334   
                                                                                                                                    
                         (0.0295)       (0.00172)       (0.00130)      (0.000870)        (0.0386)        (0.0430)        (0.0430)   
Constant                    5.964***        0.380***        0.234***        0.121***        5.956***        5.938***        5.941***
                                                                                                                         (0.0478)   
HHS Enforcement                                                                                                           -0.0732   
                                                                                                         (0.0489)        (0.0492)   
Minimum Benefit                                                                                            0.0889          0.0813   
                                                                                                         (0.0467)        (0.0467)   
Individual Mandate~r                                                                                        0.136**         0.136** 
                                                                                                         (0.0595)        (0.0595)   
Small Mandated Offer                                                                                       0.0452          0.0485   
                                                                                                         (0.0483)        (0.0483)   
Large Mandated Offer                                                                                       -0.117*         -0.119*  
                                                                                          (0.140)         (0.141)         (0.141)   
No. Psychiatris~1000                                                                        0.271           0.245           0.241   
                         (0.0340)       (0.00199)       (0.00149)       (0.00100)        (0.0345)        (0.0357)        (0.0358)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2015         0.118***     -0.00517**       0.00679***      0.00139           0.104**        0.0961**         0.101** 
                         (0.0341)       (0.00200)       (0.00150)       (0.00101)        (0.0346)        (0.0359)        (0.0361)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2014        0.0369        -0.00960***      0.00332*       0.000493          0.0212          0.0110          0.0161   
                         (0.0295)       (0.00173)       (0.00130)      (0.000870)        (0.0304)        (0.0305)        (0.0308)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2013         0.112***     -0.00615***      0.00595***      0.00219*          0.101***        0.105***        0.111***
                         (0.0294)       (0.00172)       (0.00129)      (0.000867)        (0.0301)        (0.0302)        (0.0305)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2012         0.284***      0.00581***       0.0130***      0.00570***        0.284***        0.288***        0.294***
                         (0.0292)       (0.00171)       (0.00129)      (0.000862)        (0.0299)        (0.0301)        (0.0304)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2011         0.250***      0.00451**        0.0114***      0.00477***        0.241***        0.244***        0.250***
                         (0.0295)       (0.00173)       (0.00130)      (0.000871)        (0.0301)        (0.0303)        (0.0306)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2010         0.185***    -0.000176         0.00851***      0.00437***        0.183***        0.184***        0.190***
                         (0.0226)       (0.00132)      (0.000992)      (0.000665)        (0.0234)        (0.0234)        (0.0234)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2009        0.0644**      -0.00308*        0.00393***      0.00142*         0.0559*         0.0563*         0.0554*  
                              (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2008             0               0               0               0               0               0               0   
                         (0.0241)       (0.00141)       (0.00106)      (0.000711)        (0.0246)        (0.0246)        (0.0246)   
race=4                      0.694***       0.0145***       0.0265***       0.0180***        0.664***        0.665***        0.665***
                         (0.0213)       (0.00124)      (0.000935)      (0.000627)        (0.0217)        (0.0217)        (0.0217)   
race=3                      0.247***      0.00134          0.0129***      0.00222***        0.253***        0.254***        0.254***
                         (0.0231)       (0.00135)       (0.00102)      (0.000682)        (0.0234)        (0.0234)        (0.0234)   
race=2                     -0.449***      -0.0299***      -0.0183***      -0.0113***       -0.458***       -0.457***       -0.457***
                              (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)   
race=1                          0               0               0               0               0               0               0   
                         (0.0113)      (0.000663)      (0.000499)      (0.000334)        (0.0116)        (0.0116)        (0.0116)   
RESPONDENTS SEX             1.307***        0.119***       0.0525***       0.0184***        1.305***        1.305***        1.305***
                         (0.0228)       (0.00133)       (0.00100)      (0.000672)        (0.0233)        (0.0233)        (0.0233)   
High School Degree         -3.186***      -0.0972***       -0.129***      -0.0783***       -3.193***       -3.194***       -3.194***
                         (0.0523)       (0.00306)       (0.00230)       (0.00154)        (0.0527)        (0.0556)        (0.0557)   
Individual Parity           0.101         0.00821**       0.00258         0.00373*          0.115*         0.0503          0.0542   
                         (0.0497)       (0.00291)       (0.00219)       (0.00147)        (0.0500)        (0.0508)        (0.0508)   
Small-group parity         -0.110*        -0.0114***     -0.00348        -0.00254          -0.114*         -0.108*         -0.111*  
                         (0.0290)       (0.00169)       (0.00127)      (0.000854)        (0.0298)        (0.0304)        (0.0304)   
Large-Group Parity       -0.00181         0.00222        0.000403       -0.000398         -0.0203         -0.0303         -0.0299   
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Table 3- 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Standard errors in parentheses
                                                                                                                                    
Observations              1835764         1835764         1835764         1835764         1765624         1765624         1765624   
                                                                                                                                    
                         (0.0332)       (0.00199)       (0.00147)      (0.000970)        (0.0422)        (0.0463)        (0.0463)   
Constant                    6.412***        0.395***        0.252***        0.132***        6.418***        6.429***        6.434***
                                                                                                                         (0.0510)   
HHS Enforcement                                                                                                            -0.135** 
                                                                                                         (0.0498)        (0.0501)   
Minimum Benefit                                                                                            0.0799          0.0667   
                                                                                                         (0.0485)        (0.0485)   
Individual Mandate~r                                                                                        0.108*          0.107*  
                                                                                                         (0.0621)        (0.0622)   
Small Mandated Offer                                                                                     -0.00798        -0.00128   
                                                                                                         (0.0505)        (0.0505)   
Large Mandated Offer                                                                                       -0.105*         -0.108*  
                                                                                          (0.144)         (0.145)         (0.145)   
No. Psychiatris~1000                                                                        0.246           0.197           0.191   
                         (0.0347)       (0.00209)       (0.00154)       (0.00102)        (0.0353)        (0.0365)        (0.0367)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2015         0.190***     -0.00214         0.00976***      0.00288**         0.178***        0.186***        0.195***
                         (0.0349)       (0.00210)       (0.00155)       (0.00102)        (0.0355)        (0.0368)        (0.0370)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2014        0.0742*       -0.00833***      0.00500**       0.00124          0.0623          0.0693          0.0782*  
                         (0.0306)       (0.00184)       (0.00136)      (0.000897)        (0.0315)        (0.0317)        (0.0320)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2013        0.0592        -0.00834***      0.00372**      0.000784          0.0493          0.0482          0.0594   
                         (0.0306)       (0.00184)       (0.00135)      (0.000894)        (0.0313)        (0.0314)        (0.0317)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2012         0.217***      0.00371*        0.00999***      0.00402***        0.218***        0.217***        0.228***
                         (0.0303)       (0.00183)       (0.00134)      (0.000888)        (0.0310)        (0.0312)        (0.0315)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2011         0.171***      0.00131         0.00791***      0.00296***        0.164***        0.160***        0.172***
                         (0.0306)       (0.00184)       (0.00135)      (0.000895)        (0.0312)        (0.0314)        (0.0317)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2010         0.112***     -0.00276         0.00548***      0.00254**         0.109***        0.104***        0.115***
                         (0.0234)       (0.00141)       (0.00104)      (0.000686)        (0.0243)        (0.0243)        (0.0243)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2009       0.00153        -0.00521***      0.00149      -0.0000953        -0.00493        -0.00570        -0.00738   
                              (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)   
INTERVIEW YEAR=2008             0               0               0               0               0               0               0   
                         (0.0253)       (0.00152)       (0.00112)      (0.000740)        (0.0258)        (0.0259)        (0.0259)   
race=4                      0.697***       0.0135***       0.0268***       0.0183***        0.665***        0.665***        0.665***
                         (0.0227)       (0.00137)       (0.00101)      (0.000666)        (0.0232)        (0.0232)        (0.0232)   
race=3                      0.317***      0.00243          0.0158***      0.00416***        0.319***        0.319***        0.319***
                         (0.0263)       (0.00158)       (0.00117)      (0.000770)        (0.0266)        (0.0266)        (0.0266)   
race=2                    -0.0149         -0.0136***    -0.000106        -0.00103         -0.0202         -0.0202         -0.0201   
                              (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)   
race=1                          0               0               0               0               0               0               0   
                         (0.0118)      (0.000711)      (0.000523)      (0.000346)        (0.0121)        (0.0121)        (0.0121)   
RESPONDENTS SEX             1.312***        0.122***       0.0524***       0.0183***        1.313***        1.313***        1.313***
                         (0.0269)       (0.00162)       (0.00119)      (0.000786)        (0.0274)        (0.0274)        (0.0274)   
High School Degree         -3.869***       -0.123***       -0.156***      -0.0945***       -3.889***       -3.889***       -3.889***
                         (0.0535)       (0.00322)       (0.00237)       (0.00157)        (0.0539)        (0.0570)        (0.0570)   
Individual Parity          0.0869         0.00841**       0.00187         0.00361*         0.0965          0.0520          0.0591   
                         (0.0511)       (0.00307)       (0.00226)       (0.00149)        (0.0514)        (0.0522)        (0.0523)   
Small-group parity         -0.134**       -0.0124***     -0.00434        -0.00352*         -0.133**        -0.122*         -0.128*  
                         (0.0301)       (0.00181)       (0.00133)      (0.000881)        (0.0310)        (0.0316)        (0.0316)   
Large-Group Parity         0.0258         0.00261         0.00167        0.000427         0.00927         0.00694         0.00710   
                                                                                                                                    
                          Model 1     Model 2 - 0    Model 3 - 10    Model 4 - 30         Model 5         Model 6         Model 7   
                                                                                                                                    
Insured Population
